Deliberation and Voting Rules

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_11MaRDI QIDQ5486933zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David Austen-Smith, Timothy Feddersen

Publication date 18 September 2006

Published in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Deliberative voting
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Subgroup deliberation and voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226093
• Judgment aggregation rules and voting rules
• Deliberative democracy and electoral competition
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Consensus rules for committee elections

Cited in

(29)

• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Should straw polls be banned?
• Deliberative voting
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Subgroup deliberation and voting
• Iterative deliberation via metric aggregation
• An experimental study of collective deliberation
• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Social Choice Theory
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory
• Social influence in committee deliberation
• Lying for votes
• Independent versus collective expertise
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• A model of deliberation based on Rawls's political liberalism
• Anchoring in deliberations
• Unfounded opinion's curse
• United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees

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