Voting on Majority Rules

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00278MaRDI QIDQ4810826zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn

Publication date 16 August 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00278

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generations modelsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(20)

• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Minority voting and long-term decisions
• Majority voting on orders
• Majority Rules and Incentives
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Majority vote following a debate
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• MAJORITY-VOTE ON DIRECTED BARABÁSI–ALBERT NETWORKS
• The legislative calendar
• On the existence of majority committee
• Optimal majority rule in referenda
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3873013 (Why is no real title available?)
• Endogenous institutions and political extremism
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

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