Voting on Majority Rules

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00278MaRDI QIDQ4810826zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn

Publication date 16 August 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00278

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generations modelsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(21)

• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Majority vote following a debate
• Voting over investment
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Optimal majority rule in referenda
• The legislative calendar
• Endogenous institutions and political extremism
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3873013 (Why is no real title available?)
• Majority Rules and Incentives
• MAJORITY-VOTE ON DIRECTED BARABÁSI–ALBERT NETWORKS
• On the existence of majority committee
• Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Majority voting on orders
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Minority voting and long-term decisions

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