Majority voting leads to unanimity

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0042-5zbMATH Open1118.91003OpenAlexW2126922219MaRDI QIDQ863393FDOQ863393

Authors: Geir B. Asheim, Carl Andreas Claussen, Tore Nilssen 

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2005/Memo-02-2005.pdf

Recommendations

• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• Theory of Cooperative Public Choice Games
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo

zbMATH Keywords

core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games

Cited In (7)

• Majority voting on orders
• Theory of Cooperative Public Choice Games
• Majority vote following a debate
• Majority rule with dollar voting
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Convergence results for unanimous voting

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