Majority voting leads to unanimity

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0042-5MaRDI QIDQ863393zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Geir B. Asheim, Carl Andreas Claussen, Tore Nilssen

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2005/Memo-02-2005.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• Theory of Cooperative Public Choice Games
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo

Cites work

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(7)

• Majority rule with dollar voting
• Majority vote following a debate
• Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Majority voting on orders
• Theory of Cooperative Public Choice Games
• Convergence results for unanimous voting

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