Majority rule with dollar voting

DOI10.1007/S100580100056MaRDI QIDQ1601995zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James S. Jordan

Publication date 1 July 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100056

zbMATH Keywords

balance of powercoremajority gamevon Neumann-Morgenstern solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Stable sets in majority pillage games
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
• Majority voting leads to unanimity

Cited in

(4)

• Voting power in a system of compound majority rule
• MAJORITY-VOTE ON DIRECTED BARABÁSI–ALBERT NETWORKS
• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Pillage and property

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