Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.008zbMATH Open1284.91320OpenAlexW2143653418MaRDI QIDQ2437165FDOQ2437165
Authors: Antonio Cabrales, Piero Gottardi Error creating thumbnail:
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/10679
Recommendations
- Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets
- Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
- A monopolistic market for information
- Public information quality with monopolistic sellers
- Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Job contact networks.
- A monopolistic market for information
- Coordination, ``Magic, and reinforcement learning in a market entry game
- Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2437165)
