Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry

DOI10.2307/2951571zbMATH Open0825.90290OpenAlexW2156558082WikidataQ30048142 ScholiaQ30048142MaRDI QIDQ4013236FDOQ4013236

Authors: Steven Berry 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fd00553f0ea0b4a44c0a8552cb06feb5ace726ba

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (37)

• Sunk costs, entry and clustering
• Identification of dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria
• Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria
• Estimation of quantity games in the presence of indivisibilities and heterogeneous firms
• Semiparametric identification of binary decision games of incomplete information with correlated private signals
• An econometric model of network formation with an application to board interlocks between firms
• Calculating upper and lower probability bounds on the outcomes of large entry games
• Identification and estimation of games with incomplete information using excluded regressors
• Optimal transportation and the falsifiability of incompletely specified economic models
• Efficient entry
• A dynamic oligopoly game of the US airline industry: estimation and policy experiments
• Rare Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in large static games
• A geometric approach to inference in set-identified entry games
• Multiple treatments with strategic substitutes
• Discerning Solution Concepts for Discrete Games
• A Bayesian approach to estimation of dynamic models with small and large number of heterogeneous players and latent serially correlated states
• Inefficient entry order in preemption games
• Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution
• COMPETITION AND MULTILEVEL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS ADOPTION IN U.S. HOSPITALS
• Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types
• Market size, competition, and entrepreneurs' location choices
• Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information
• Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
• Simulated maximum likelihood estimation for discrete choices using transformed simulated frequencies
• Identification of complete information games
• Inference in ordered response games with complete information
• Bounds for best response functions in binary games
• Semiparametric estimation of signaling games with equilibrium refinement
• Counterfactual sensitivity and robustness
• Estimation of finite sequential games
• Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
• Nonparametric identification of the distribution of random coefficients in binary response static games of complete information
• Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals
• Inference in an incomplete information entry game with an incumbent and with beliefs conditioned on unobservable market characteristics
• Pairwise-difference estimation of incomplete information games
• Identification and estimation of incomplete information games with multiple equilibria

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