Identification of dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria
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Publication:2074594
Cites work
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Cited in
(8)- Set identification in models with multiple equilibria
- Identification and estimation of games with incomplete information using excluded regressors
- Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players’ Beliefs Are Not in Equilibrium
- ESTIMATION OF (STATIC OR DYNAMIC) GAMES UNDER EQUILIBRIUM MULTIPLICITY
- Identification and estimation of dynamic structural models with unobserved choices
- Estimation and inference in games of incomplete information with unobserved heterogeneity and large state space
- Sharp test for equilibrium uniqueness in discrete games with private information and common knowledge unobserved heterogeneity
- Testing homogeneity in dynamic discrete games in finite samples
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