Direct and Indirect Sale of Information

DOI10.2307/2938355MaRDI QIDQ3354435zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer

Publication date 1990

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2938355

zbMATH Keywords

private informationinvestment decisionsmutual fundsmonopolistmarkets for informationoptimal sellingnewsletters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(19)

• How to sell hard information
• Two experiments on trading information goods in a network
• Information acquisition and mutual funds
• Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation.
• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• On the value of information in a strategic conflict
• Pre-sale information
• A monopolistic market for information
• Buyers, sellers, and middlemen: variations on search-theoretic themes
• Workup
• Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals?
• Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits
• Endogenous growth under multiple uses of data
• Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies
• Conformism and public news
• Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets
• Reselling information
• Towards data auctions with externalities
• Selling information in competitive environments

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