Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.007zbMath1419.91142OpenAlexW2900784685MaRDI QIDQ1735778

Isabel Marcin, Michael Kurschilgen

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformationknowledgecheap talksocial statusimage utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Moral awareness polarizes people's fairness judgments

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE
• hroot

Cites Work

• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Overconfidence and Social Signalling
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling

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