Cited in
(42)- That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
- Motivated memory in dictator games
- The sophistication of conditional cooperators: evidence from public goods games
- Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
- Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
- How to split gains and losses? Experimental evidence of dictator and ultimatum games
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Decision making for others: the case of loss aversion
- Cooperation of pairs
- Volunteering under population uncertainty
- The swing voter's curse in social networks
- What goes around, comes around: experimental evidence on exposed lies
- Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions
- The impact of previous action on bargaining -- an experiment on the emergence of preferences for fairness norms
- Good decision vs. good results: outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents
- Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation
- Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom
- Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups
- G*Power 3
- ORSEE
- Z-Tree
- oTree
- signrankex
- SoSci Survey
- A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction
- Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
- Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence
- Elicited salience and salience-based level-\(k\)
- Ambiguity attitudes in decisions for others
- Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma
- Teams do inflict costly third-party punishment as individuals do: experimental evidence
- Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
- The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
- Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
- Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions
- The limits to moral erosion in markets: social norms and the replacement excuse
- Lying and reciprocity
- On self-serving strategic beliefs
- Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation
- Using coordination games to measure beliefs
- Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods
- Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation
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