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swMATH38368MaRDI QIDQ54068FDOQ54068

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Cited In (36)

• That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
• Motivated memory in dictator games
• The sophistication of conditional cooperators: evidence from public goods games
• Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• How to split gains and losses? Experimental evidence of dictator and ultimatum games
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Decision making for others: the case of loss aversion
• Cooperation of pairs
• Volunteering under population uncertainty
• The swing voter's curse in social networks
• Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions
• What goes around, comes around: experimental evidence on exposed lies
• The impact of previous action on bargaining -- an experiment on the emergence of preferences for fairness norms
• Good decision vs. good results: outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents
• Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation
• Hedging, ambiguity, and the reversal of order axiom
• Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups
• A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence
• Elicited salience and salience-based level-\(k\)
• Ambiguity attitudes in decisions for others
• Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma
• Teams do inflict costly third-party punishment as individuals do: experimental evidence
• Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
• The influence of self and social image concerns on lying
• Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions
• Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
• The limits to moral erosion in markets: social norms and the replacement excuse
• Lying and reciprocity
• On self-serving strategic beliefs
• Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation
• Using coordination games to measure beliefs
• Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods
• Lying opportunities and incentives to Lie: reference dependence versus reputation

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