Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
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Publication:894627
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.001zbMATH Open1347.91109DBLPjournals/geb/ParravanoP15OpenAlexW2235866584WikidataQ56687822 ScholiaQ56687822MaRDI QIDQ894627FDOQ894627
Authors: Melanie Parravano, Odile Poulsen 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001
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Cites Work
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
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- The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
- Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
- Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
- The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Large Stakes and Big Mistakes
- Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
- How portable is level-0 behavior? A test of level-\(k\) theory in games with non-neutral frames
Cited In (8)
- Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
- Rationalizing focal points
- Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
- Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation
- Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence
- Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions
- Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
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