Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.001MaRDI QIDQ894627zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Melanie Parravano, Odile Poulsen

Publication date 2 December 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

labelscoordinationfocal pointpayoff asymmetrystake size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
• Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
• Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
• How portable is level-0 behavior? A test of level-\(k\) theory in games with non-neutral frames
• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• The effect of stakes in distribution experiments
• The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)

Cited in

(8)

• Dynamic focal points in \(N\)-person coordination games
• Rationalizing focal points
• Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining
• Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation
• Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence
• Failing to utilize potentially effective focal points: prominence can stymie coordination on distinct actions
• Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence

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Uses Software

• hroot

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