Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.027zbMath1254.91095MaRDI QIDQ1927868

Ondrej Rydval, Andreas Ortmann

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.027

zbMATH Keywords

experiments; coordination games; selection principles; stag-hunt games; loss avoidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A90: Experimental studies

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Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
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