Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2280798)
Abstract: We analyze in this paper finite horizon hierarchical signaling games between (information provider) senders and (decision maker) receivers in a dynamic environment. The underlying information evolves in time while sender and receiver interact repeatedly. Different from the classical communication (control) models, however, the sender (sensor) and the receiver (controller) have different objectives and there is a hierarchy between the players such that the sender leads the game by announcing his policies beforehand. He needs to anticipate the reaction of the receiver and the impact of the actions on the horizon while controlling the transparency of the disclosed information at each interaction. With quadratic cost functions and multivariate Gaussian processes, evolving according to first order auto-regressive models, we show that memoryless "linear" sender signaling rules are optimal (in the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium) within the general class of measurable policies in the noncooperative communication context. In the noncooperative control context, we also analyze the hierarchical equilibrium for linear signaling rules and provide an algorithm to compute the optimal linear signaling rules numerically with global optimality guarantees.
Recommendations
- Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- On the Optimality of Linear Signaling to Deceive Kalman Filters over Finite/Infinite Horizons
- Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games
- Information revelation through signalling
- Signaling of information
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4160608 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1243371 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Estimation With Strategic Sensors
- Game-Theoretic Methods for Robustness, Security, and Resilience of Cyberphysical Control Systems: Games-in-Games Principle for Optimal Cross-Layer Resilient Control Systems
- Graph implementations for nonsmooth convex programs
- Invariance of convex sets under linear transformations
- Matrix Analysis
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Professional advice
- Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
- Quantized consensus
- Semidefinite Optimization and Convex Algebraic Geometry
- Simultaneous design of measurement and control strategies for stochastic systems with feedback
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The effect of deception on optimal decisions
Cited in
(7)- On the Optimality of Linear Signaling to Deceive Kalman Filters over Finite/Infinite Horizons
- Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
- Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
- Decomposition strategy-based hierarchical least mean square algorithm for control systems from the impulse responses
- Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
- Compartmental observability approach for the optimal transparency problem in multi-agent systems
- Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
This page was built for publication: Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2280798)
