On the Optimality of Linear Signaling to Deceive Kalman Filters over Finite/Infinite Horizons

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_27zbMath1446.91028OpenAlexW2982147961MaRDI QIDQ3297682

Tamer Başar, Muhammed O. Sayin

Publication date: 20 July 2020

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_27

zbMATH Keywords

signalingsecuritysemi-definite programminginfinite-horizonStackelberg gamesdeception

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Semidefinite programming (90C22) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Optimal transmission scheduling for remote state estimation in CPSs with energy harvesting two-hop relay networks ⋮ Robust designs through risk sensitivity: an overview

Cites Work

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• A trace inequality of John von Neumann
• Hierarchical multistage Gaussian signaling games in noncooperative communication and control systems
• Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria
• Estimation With Strategic Sensors
• Deceptive Routing in Relay Networks
• Elements of Information Theory

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