Persuasion and learning by countersignaling

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.10.002zbMATH Open1288.91025OpenAlexW2031450844MaRDI QIDQ2453053FDOQ2453053

Authors: Kim-Sau Chung, Péter Eső 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.002

Recommendations

• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Market signaling with grades
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Education signaling with uncertain return
• Signaling private choices

zbMATH Keywords

learningsignalingpersuasioncountersignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Professional advice
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (6)

• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Persuasion with costly precision
• False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
• Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types
• Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
• Resisting persuasion

This page was built for publication: Persuasion and learning by countersignaling

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453053)