When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework?

DOI10.1515/bejte-2020-0069OpenAlexW3136630728MaRDI QIDQ2690339

Mpoifeng Molefinyane, Alexander Zimper

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0069

zbMATH Keywords

regulationasymmetric informationknowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/wiki/Publication:5441272 Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information]
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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