When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework?

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0069MaRDI QIDQ2690339zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Zimper, Mpoifeng Molefinyane

Publication date 16 March 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0069

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationknowledgeregulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• An elementary proof of Blackwell's theorem
• Blackwell's ordering and public information.
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Marginal deadweight loss when the income tax is nonlinear
• Professional advice
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Two Remarks on Blackwell's Theorem

Cited in

(1)

• Time delay and the extraction of information rent in regulation

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