Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00782-3MaRDI QIDQ1361898zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mathijs Jansen, Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, Hans Peters

Publication date 28 July 1997

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strong consistencyconsistency of assessmentsinfinite signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Bayesian and consistent assessments
• Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(2)

• A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles
• Bayesian and consistent assessments

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