Optimal contingent delegation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105597OpenAlexW4313367774MaRDI QIDQ2685855

Xi Weng, Tan Gan, Ju Hu

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105597

zbMATH Keywords

adaptationcoordinationdominant strategy mechanism designcontingent delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Governing Adaptation¹
• Resource Allocation in the Brain
• Optimal Delegation

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