Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00873-0MaRDI QIDQ6581887zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Quan Li, Kang Rong

Publication date 1 August 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-023-00873-0

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncompetitionfull disclosuremultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Competition in persuasion: an experiment

Cites work

• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Sequential persuasion
• The war of information

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