BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12237zbMATH Open1403.91110OpenAlexW2752016780MaRDI QIDQ5370534FDOQ5370534

Authors: Mike Felgenhauer, Petra Loerke 

Publication date: 20 October 2017

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176

Recommendations

• Private Bayesian persuasion
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• Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

zbMATH Keywords

senderBayesian persuasionreceiverprivate experimentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cited In (11)

• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• Bayesian markets to elicit private information
• State of the debate contingent arguments

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