BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12237MaRDI QIDQ5370534zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mike Felgenhauer, Petra Loerke

Publication date 20 October 2017

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176

zbMATH Keywords

senderBayesian persuasionreceiverprivate experimentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Cited in

(16)

• Impact of private observation in the Bayesian persuasion game
• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• The face value of arguments with and without manipulation
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials
• Bayesian markets to elicit private information
• Experimental design to persuade
• State of the debate contingent arguments

This page was built for publication: BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5370534)