An optimistic search equilibrium
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Cites work
- A decentralized market with common values uncertainty: Non-steady states
- A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Decentralized trading with private information
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1541910 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information percolation with equilibrium search dynamics
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings: The one sided information case
- Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Optimal stalling when bargaining
- Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Waiting to Persuade
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