Legislative bargaining and coalition formation

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2846zbMath1039.91005OpenAlexW3124012979MaRDI QIDQ697927

Peter Norman

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/51602e293a08bc260d915cbaaf6a22f5a843c7f5

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationlegislative bargaininggeneric uniquenessminimal winning coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases ⋮ Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ The formateurs' role in government formation ⋮ A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining ⋮ Legislative bargaining and coalition formation ⋮ Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application ⋮ Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

Cites Work

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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