Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
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Publication:697927
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2846zbMATH Open1039.91005OpenAlexW3124012979MaRDI QIDQ697927FDOQ697927
Authors: Peter Norman 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/51602e293a08bc260d915cbaaf6a22f5a843c7f5
Recommendations
- Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Legislative bargaining with teams
- Bargaining for coalition structure formation
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Demand bargaining in legislatures
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Coalition formation and stability
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
Cited In (42)
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- Executive control and legislative success
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- The formateurs' role in government formation
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
- Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
- Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining
- On dynamic compromise
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty
- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
- Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
- Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
- Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
- Group bargaining: a model of international treaty ratification
- The legislative calendar
- Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Universalism and the value of political power
- Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Legislative bargaining with teams
- Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases
- Demand bargaining in legislatures
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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