Legislative bargaining and coalition formation

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2846zbMath1039.91005MaRDI QIDQ697927

Peter Norman

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/51602e293a08bc260d915cbaaf6a22f5a843c7f5

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formation; legislative bargaining; generic uniqueness; minimal winning coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Formal versus informal legislative bargaining, Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games, Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members, Legislative bargaining and coalition formation, Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application, Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases, The formateurs' role in government formation, A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model, Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games, Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence, Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining, Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments, Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining, Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty, Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

Cites Work

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model