Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9zbMath1287.91085OpenAlexW2168971108MaRDI QIDQ2452136

Tomohiko Kawamori

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
• A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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