Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0567-9zbMATH Open1287.91085OpenAlexW2168971108MaRDI QIDQ2452136FDOQ2452136

Authors: Tomohiko Kawamori 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9

Recommendations

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
• Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
• A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining

Cited In (5)

• Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals
• Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

This page was built for publication: Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452136)