Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
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Publication:2440759
DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2007.12.021zbMath1283.93034OpenAlexW1498105513MaRDI QIDQ2440759
Alessandra Sgobbi, Carlo Carraro
Publication date: 19 March 2014
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2007.12.021
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Cites Work
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