Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
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Publication:1293739
DOI10.1007/S001990050270zbMATH Open0942.91035OpenAlexW3125263496MaRDI QIDQ1293739FDOQ1293739
Authors: Lutz-Alexander Busch, Ignatius J. Horstmann
Publication date: 24 August 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050270
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- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
- A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
- Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
- All in good time
- Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. II: Unrestricted agendas
- Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
- Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
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