Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S001990050270MaRDI QIDQ1293739zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lutz-Alexander Busch, Ignatius J. Horstmann

Publication date 24 August 2000

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050270

zbMATH Keywords

agenda bargainingincomplete informationmulti-issue bargainingsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(9)

• A comment on issue-by-issue negotiations
• The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
• Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference
• Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. II: Unrestricted agendas
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
• Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
• Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials
• All in good time

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