Bargaining over the budget

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0510-5MaRDI QIDQ537546zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong

Publication date 20 May 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0510-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Universalism and the value of political power
• Budget processes: theory and experimental evidence
• Optimal taxation and strategic budget deficit under political regime switching
• Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition

Cites work

• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making

Cited in

(5)

• Haggling over substitutes
• BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Budget processes: theory and experimental evidence
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

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