Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105716MaRDI QIDQ6139967zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Matthew O. Jackson, Philippe Muller, Oriol Tejada

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716

zbMATH Keywords

electionsMarkov perfect equilibriumpolitical polarizationcosts of change

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
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• A dynamic theory of electoral competition
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Cites work

• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Game theory
• Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
• Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• The political economy of debt and entitlements
• Two-party competition with persistent policies

Cited in

(1)

• Strategic flip-flopping in political competition

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