Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105716OpenAlexW3121797552MaRDI QIDQ6139967FDOQ6139967

Authors: Hans Gersbach, Matthew O. Jackson, Philippe Muller, Oriol Tejada 

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716

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zbMATH Keywords

electionsMarkov perfect equilibriumpolitical polarizationcosts of change

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
• Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
• The political economy of debt and entitlements

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