Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
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Publication:2334845
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.08.004zbMATH Open1426.91096OpenAlexW2189363359MaRDI QIDQ2334845FDOQ2334845
Authors: Paan Jindapon, Matt Van Essen 
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.08.004
Recommendations
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Voting theory (91B12) Economic growth models (91B62)
Cites Work
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- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
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- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Climate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
Cited In (9)
- A theory of political and economic cycles
- A theory of political cycles
- Political Cycles and Cyclical Policies
- Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
- A mean-reverting stochastic model for the political business cycle
- Is there a political business cycle in Chancellor Schroeder's Germany?
- Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results
- Cycles and chaos in political party voting—a research note
- Political business cycle -- mathematical models
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