Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
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Publication:2334845
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Expectations and Stability
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Climate politics: how public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
- On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
Cited in
(9)- Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results
- Is there a political business cycle in Chancellor Schroeder's Germany?
- Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
- A theory of political and economic cycles
- Political business cycle -- mathematical models
- Cycles and chaos in political party voting—a research note
- A theory of political cycles
- Political Cycles and Cyclical Policies
- A mean-reverting stochastic model for the political business cycle
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