Personal power dynamics in bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105530MaRDI QIDQ2095258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Renee Bowen, Ilwoo Hwang, Stefan Krasa

Publication date 9 November 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105530

zbMATH Keywords

learningbargaininggridlockpersonal power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining under strategic uncertainty: the role of second-order optimism
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Gambling reputation: repeated bargaining with outside options
• Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Negatively Correlated Bandits
• On dynamic compromise
• Preemptive policy experimentation
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

Cited in

(1)

• Leadership ability and agenda choice

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