The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
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Recommendations
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- Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
Cited in
(17)- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Corruption and bicameral reforms
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game
- Bargaining over the budget
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining
- Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?
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