Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:423076
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.11.004zbMath1237.91090MaRDI QIDQ423076
Maria Montero, Vera Zaporozhets, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 18 May 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2012/wp_idei_716.pdf
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