Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
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Publication:423076
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.11.004zbMath1237.91090OpenAlexW3124572220MaRDI QIDQ423076
Maria Montero, Vera Zaporozhets, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 18 May 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2012/wp_idei_716.pdf
Related Items (19)
The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ Two-tier voting: measuring inequality and specifying the inverse power problem ⋮ Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not? ⋮ On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ Exits from the European Union and their effect on power distribution in the council ⋮ Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics ⋮ A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting ⋮ On the enumeration of some inequivalent monotone Boolean functions ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Proper strong-Fibonacci games ⋮ Sequential legislative lobbying ⋮ The nucleolus of large majority games ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication ⋮ Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU ⋮ Tensor approximation of cooperative games and their semivalues ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation ⋮ On the enumeration of Boolean functions with distinguished variables
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