On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games

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Publication:5538341

DOI10.1137/0116042zbMath0155.29201OpenAlexW2166968008MaRDI QIDQ5538341

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1968

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0116042



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