The nucleolus of large majority games
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Publication:2452975
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041zbMath1336.91014arXiv1310.0004OpenAlexW2032337372MaRDI QIDQ2452975
Stefan Napel, Sascha Kurz, Andreas Nohn
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.0004
Related Items (7)
The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ Representation-compatible power indices ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ The integer nucleolus of directed simple games: a characterization and an algorithm ⋮ A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index ⋮ Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games ⋮ A heuristic procedure for computing the nucleolus
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- On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
- On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
- On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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