The nucleolus of large majority games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041zbMath1336.91014arXiv1310.0004OpenAlexW2032337372MaRDI QIDQ2452975

Stefan Napel, Sascha Kurz, Andreas Nohn

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.0004

zbMATH Keywords

representationnucleolusTU gameweighted majority game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ Representation-compatible power indices ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ The integer nucleolus of directed simple games: a characterization and an algorithm ⋮ A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index ⋮ Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games ⋮ A heuristic procedure for computing the nucleolus

Cites Work

• Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
• Renewal theory for sampling without replacement
• Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
• On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
• On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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