Representation-compatible power indices

DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2672-3MaRDI QIDQ1639286zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Serguei Kaniovski, Sascha Kurz

Publication date 12 June 2018

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.05963, https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/2080/1/awr_index.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

first average representationpower indexproportionality between weights and power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Abstract: This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.

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Cited in

(5)

• Reformulation of some indices using null player free winning coalitions
• Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations
• Comparing power indices
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1374992 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

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Uses Software

• LattE
• JBool

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