Tractable dynamic global games and applications
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Publication:2434238
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.015zbMath1284.91054MaRDI QIDQ2434238
Laurent Mathevet, Jakub Steiner
Publication date: 5 February 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/174737/1/dynamic_global_game.pdf
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B99: Mathematical economics
91A25: Dynamic games
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