Tractable dynamic global games and applications

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.015zbMath1284.91054MaRDI QIDQ2434238

Laurent Mathevet, Jakub Steiner

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/174737/1/dynamic_global_game.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

unique equilibrium; coordination; welfare; dynamic game; taxation; global games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B99: Mathematical economics

91A25: Dynamic games

Related Items

Intertemporal coordination with delay options, Coordination via delay: theory and experiment, Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab

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