Speculative attacks with multiple targets

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0806-2MaRDI QIDQ405712zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Junichi Fujimoto

Publication date 5 September 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_501.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

global gamesregime changespeculative attackscurrency crises

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES
• “Large” versus “Small” Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks
• Learning and complementarities in speculative attacks
• CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3704885 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484308 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1849866 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3337815 (Why is no real title available?)
• A contraction principle for finite global games
• Banks, relative performance, and sequential contagion
• Bayes theory
• Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios
• Coordination and delay in global games
• Coordination of mobile labor
• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
• Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Introduction to Calculus and Classical Analysis
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• Measure and integration theory. Transl. from the German by Robert B. Burckel
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games
• Problems in mathematical analysis II. Continuity and differentiation. Transl. from the Polish, revised and augmented by the authors
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Speculative attacks with multiple targets
• Speculative dynamics

Cited in

(4)

• SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5242716 (Why is no real title available?)
• Speculative attacks with multiple targets
• CURRENCY ATTACKS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF WAGE-SETTERS

This page was built for publication: Speculative attacks with multiple targets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q405712)