Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

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Publication:4810825

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00277zbMath1070.91023OpenAlexW2086404008WikidataQ57661549 ScholiaQ57661549MaRDI QIDQ4810825

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Publication date: 16 August 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/25045/1/dp372.pdf




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