Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
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Publication:405536
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011zbMath1296.91024OpenAlexW2051103631MaRDI QIDQ405536
Tadashi Sekiguchi, Yasuyuki Miyahara
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011
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Cites Work
- Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
- Commitment games
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
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