Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
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Recommendations
- Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
- Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
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- Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring
- Toward a classification of finite partial-monitoring games
- Toward a classification of finite partial-monitoring games
- High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620865
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Cites work
- Commitment games
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem
- Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
- Sequential Equilibria
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
- The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
Cited in
(6)- Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality
- Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
- A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring
- Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620865 (Why is no real title available?)
- High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
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