Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Publication:1280596
DOI10.1023/A:1018936819942zbMATH Open0916.90288OpenAlexW47460807MaRDI QIDQ1280596FDOQ1280596
Authors: Andrés Faíña-Medín, Ignacio García-Jurado, José Méndez-Naya, Luciano Méndez-Naya
Publication date: 30 June 1999
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018936819942
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Cited In (8)
- The role of commitment in repeated games
- Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
- The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
- Commitment games
- Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
- Bilateral commitment
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