Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1023/A:1018936819942MaRDI QIDQ1280596zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrés Faíña-Medín, Ignacio García-Jurado, José Méndez-Naya, Luciano Méndez-Naya

Publication date 30 June 1999

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018936819942

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprisoners' dilemmaunilateral commitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(9)

• The role of commitment in repeated games
• Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
• The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
• Commitment games
• Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Unilateral commitments in finitely repeated games
• Bilateral commitment
• Delegation and strategic altruism: a theoretical approach

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