The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions

DOI10.1016/J.JMP.2021.102640zbMATH Open1496.91072OpenAlexW4220752860MaRDI QIDQ2154153FDOQ2154153

Nick Chater, Tigran A. Melkonyan, Hossam Zeitoun

Publication date: 14 July 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102640

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentsubgame perfectioncredible threatstacit agreementvirtual bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cognitive psychology (91E10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The chain store paradox
• The Bargaining Problem
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Multilateral Bargaining
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Control System Dynamics
• Taking turns
• Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social control
• Predicting Pragmatic Reasoning in Language Games

Cited In (2)

• Psychological contract model for knowledge collaboration in virtual community of practice: an analysis based on the game theory
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence

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