Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2016.12.008zbMATH Open1375.91028OpenAlexW2565745880MaRDI QIDQ1674286FDOQ1674286

Authors: Tetsushi Ohdaira 

Publication date: 2 November 2017

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008

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• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmulti-agent systemsevolutionary computationsspatial prisoner's dilemma gamepeer-punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous

Cited In (13)

• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• The diversity in the decision facilitates cooperation in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game
• Proportional cost for punishment enhances spatial reciprocity in evolutionary games
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
• Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
• Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity

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