Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
- Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
- Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
- Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
Cited in
(13)- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
- Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
- Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks
- Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
- Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
- Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Proportional cost for punishment enhances spatial reciprocity in evolutionary games
- The diversity in the decision facilitates cooperation in the sequential prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
- Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
- Cooperative evolution under the joint influence of local popularity and global popularity
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