Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2021.126839OpenAlexW4205100113MaRDI QIDQ2669342

Hui Yang, Jinxiu Pi, Guang-Hui Yang

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2021.126839

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsindividual disguisepeer punishment\(N\)-person snowdrift gamesmutation-selection process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Related Items (1)

Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs

Cites Work

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