Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in N-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2021.126839OpenAlexW4205100113MaRDI QIDQ2669342FDOQ2669342

Authors: Jinxiu Pi, H. Yang, Guang-Hui Yang 

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2021.126839

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsindividual disguisepeer punishment\(N\)-person snowdrift gamesmutation-selection process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The replicator equation and other game dynamics
• Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
• Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Evolutionary games in interacting communities
• Heterogeneous fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
• Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
• A two-phenotype model of immune evasion by cancer cells
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
• Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
• Three-strategy \(N\)-person snowdrift game incorporating loners
• Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
• Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Replicator dynamics of an \(N\)-player snowdrift game with delayed payoffs

Cited In (2)

• Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
• Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs

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