Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2170619
DOI10.1016/j.physa.2022.127927OpenAlexW4285499403MaRDI QIDQ2170619
Wei Tang, Jinxiu Pi, Hui Yang, Guang-Hui Yang
Publication date: 6 September 2022
Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2022.127927
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Replicator dynamics under perturbations and time delays
- An evolving stag-hunt game with elimination and reproduction on regular lattices
- Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games
- Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
- Analysis and shifting of stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
- On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
- Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
- Dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift games in structured populations
- Stag hunt with unknown outside options
- Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
- Memory mechanism with weighting promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games
- Stochastically stable equilibria in the nonlinear public goods game
- Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
- On the expected number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games with correlated payoff matrix
- Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise
- The replicator equation and other game dynamics
- UNCERTAINTIES FACILITATE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN A SPATIAL HAWK–DOVE GAME
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
