On the expected number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games with correlated payoff matrix

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Publication:2280202

DOI10.1007/S13235-018-0276-4zbMATH Open1429.91047DBLPjournals/dga/DuongTH19arXiv1708.01672OpenAlexW2777591137WikidataQ59902307 ScholiaQ59902307MaRDI QIDQ2280202FDOQ2280202


Authors: Manh Hong Duong, Hoang Minh Tran, The Anh Han Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 18 December 2019

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological diversity. The analysis so far has focused on random games of independent payoff entries. In this paper, we overcome this restrictive assumption by considering multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games where the payoff matrix entries are correlated random variables. Using techniques from the random polynomial theory we establish a closed formula for the mean numbers of internal (stable) equilibria. We then characterise the asymptotic behaviour of this important quantity for large group sizes and study the effect of the correlation. Our results show that decreasing the correlation among payoffs (namely, of a strategist for different group compositions) leads to larger mean numbers of (stable) equilibrium points, suggesting that the system or population behavioural diversity can be promoted by increasing independence of the payoff entries. Numerical results are provided to support the obtained analytical results.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.01672




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