Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
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Publication:1786417
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026zbMath1397.91078OpenAlexW2055164719WikidataQ45950993 ScholiaQ45950993MaRDI QIDQ1786417
Publication date: 24 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026
Related Items (34)
Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources ⋮ Promotion of cooperation induced by discriminators in the spatial multi-player donor-recipient game ⋮ Statistical physics of human cooperation ⋮ The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery ⋮ Pool-rewarding in \(N\)-person snowdrift game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment ⋮ The optimal control for promoting the cooperation in evolution game generated by prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in the spatial public goods game with tolerance-based expulsion and cooperation ⋮ The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism ⋮ The role of alliance cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games with time costs ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in \(N\)-person snowdrift games with peer punishment and individual disguise ⋮ Analysis of dynamic evolution process of the N-player division of labor game model ⋮ Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism ⋮ The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with dynamic resource allocation: a fairness preference perspective ⋮ Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game ⋮ Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria in the nonlinear public goods game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games ⋮ Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game ⋮ Replicator dynamics for involution in an infinite well-mixed population ⋮ Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations ⋮ Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma ⋮ Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous ⋮ The impact of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game with exclusion ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies ⋮ Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations ⋮ Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks?
Cites Work
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Public goods games with reward in finite populations
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
- Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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