Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.05.007zbMATH Open1397.91487OpenAlexW2010095057WikidataQ44992052 ScholiaQ44992052MaRDI QIDQ1790778FDOQ1790778

Joung Hun Lee, Yoh Iwasa

Publication date: 4 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.007

Recommendations

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Preventing the tragedy of the commons through punishment of over-consumers and encouragement of under-consumers
• Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games

zbMATH Keywords

mixed logitmonitoringcommon pool resource managementfalse accusation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The Calculus of Selfishness
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (9)

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games
• Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication
• Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight
• Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
• The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata

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