Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.05.007MaRDI QIDQ1790778zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yoh Iwasa, Joung Hun Lee

Publication date 4 October 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

mixed logitmonitoringcommon pool resource managementfalse accusation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Preventing the tragedy of the commons through punishment of over-consumers and encouragement of under-consumers
• Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
• Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653916 (Why is no real title available?)
• Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(9)

• The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata
• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication
• Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
• Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources
• Compulsory persistent cooperation in continuous public goods games
• Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
• Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups with punishment and foresight

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