The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.030zbMath1451.91018OpenAlexW2020159048WikidataQ50919825 ScholiaQ50919825MaRDI QIDQ2209900

Martin Zwick, Jeffrey A. Fletcher

Publication date: 5 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.030

zbMATH Keywords

Simpson's paradoxHamilton's rule\(n\)-player prisoner's dilemmaprice covariance equationstrong versus weak altruism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Understanding microbial cooperation ⋮ Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations ⋮ When to go with the crowd: modelling synchronization of all-or-nothing activity transitions in grouped animals ⋮ The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations ⋮ Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds ⋮ Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations ⋮ The evolution of group-level pathogenic traits

Cites Work

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• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups
• Kin Selection: Its Components
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• A theory of group selection.
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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