Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.018zbMath1406.91037OpenAlexW2796832372WikidataQ88372903 ScholiaQ88372903MaRDI QIDQ1715254

Feng Huang, Xiaojie Chen, Long Wang

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.018

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary game theorypublic goods gamescorrupt punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation, The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service, Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators, Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control

Cites Work

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