Public goods games with reward in finite populations
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Publication:659001
DOI10.1007/S00285-010-0363-7zbMath1230.92004OpenAlexW2101255669WikidataQ38430225 ScholiaQ38430225MaRDI QIDQ659001
Peter A. I. Forsyth, Christoph Hauert
Publication date: 9 February 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-010-0363-7
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) General biology and biomathematics (92B05) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (7)
Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game ⋮ Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations ⋮ The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism ⋮ The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations ⋮ The public goods game with a new form of shared reward ⋮ Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations ⋮ Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
Cites Work
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- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- The dynamics of public goods
- Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
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