Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2583756
Recommendations
- Enforcement and over-compliance
- Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation.
- The effect of punishment on firm compliance with hazardous waste regulations
- EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
- Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
Cited in
(17)- The revealed preferences of state EPAs: Stringency, enforcement, and substitution
- EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
- How penalty affects enforcement of environmental regulations
- Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations.
- Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation.
- A theory of filtered enforcement
- Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants
- Financial incentives and endogenous enforcement in China's pollution levy system
- Incentives for pollution control: Regulation or information?
- The effect of punishment on firm compliance with hazardous waste regulations
- What improves environmental compliance? Evidence from Mexican industry
- Enforcement and over-compliance
- Regulation with anticipated learning about environmental damages
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions
- Environmental standards: examining a regulator's strategy for setting a deadline
- Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk
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